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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Amy Tobiasson, who had a history of lying to the police and had been previously 
cited for a false report of rape or sexual assault, accused Jonathan A Collins of 
committing lewd conduct. Mr. Collins was charged with felony lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. After Mr. Collins gave notice of his intent to use evidence that the 
Ms. Tobiasson had lied to police officers in the past, the district court granted the State's 
motion to dismiss the lewd conduct charge. Mr. Collins subsequently filed a motion to 
seal the court record pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i). The district 
court denied Mr. Collins' motion to seal the court record. On appeal, Mr. Collins asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to seal the 
court record. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Tobiasson contacted the Boise City Police Department and alleged that her 
three-year-old daughter, AT., had told her that Ms. Tobiasson's boyfriend, Mr. Collins, 
had touched AT.'s "bum." (R., p.54.) However, AT. refused to speak to an officer 
when the officer later contacted AT. and Ms. Tobiasson. (R., p.54.) 
Additionally, Ms. Tobiasson had a history of lying to the police. (R., pp.69, 79; 
see R., pp.91-98.) On one occasion, where Ms. Tobiasson was charged with DUI and 
cited for leaving the scene of an accident, she told the police that her friend had been 
driving the vehicle, although all the witnesses stated that Ms. Tobiasson had been the 
one driving. (R., pp.91-92.) Later, Ms. Tobiasson falsely accused a man of rape or 
sexual assault, before admitting to the police that she had lied about the incident and 
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made up the entire story. (R., pp.93-95.) Ms. Tobiasson "was actually cited and not 
arrested for the false report." (R., p.98.) 
After Mr. Collins told his probation officer about the allegation, the probation 
officer told him he had no choice but to take a polygraph test. (R., p.54.) Later, 
Mr. Collins arrived at the Boise City Police Department to take the polygraph test. 
(R., pp.54-55.) Mr. Collins underwent an extended pre-polygraph interview with a police 
detective, and after three hours of police questioning he admitted to touching AT.'s 
vagina, over her clothes, for approximately one second. (R., p.55.) 
A CARES examination over two months after the alleged incident did not reveal 
any physical evidence that AT. had been abused. (R., p.56.) During the CARES 
examination, AT. did not repeat, with any specificity, the statements she allegedly 
made to Ms. Tobiasson. (R., p.56.) 
The State then filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Collins had committed the 
crime of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-150B. (R., pp.6-7.) After Mr. Collins waived the preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate bound him over to the district court. (R., p.25.) The State then filed an 
Information charging Mr. Collins with the above offense. (R., pp.2B-29.) Mr. Collins 
entered a not guilty plea to the charge. (R., p.32.) 
Mr. Col/ins subsequently filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b), notifying the 
State that he intended to use evidence showing that Ms. Tobiasson had lied to police 
officers in the past. (R., pp.69-70.) About a week later, the State filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, requesting that the district court dismiss the lewd conduct charge because, "In 
the interest of justice, the State no longer wishes to proceed with this matter." 
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(R., p.7i.) The district court then issued an Order to Dismiss, dismissing the lewd 
conduct charge. (R., p.72.) 
Later, Mr. Collins filed a Motion to Seal Court Record, pursuant to Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32(i). (R., pp.74-8i.) Mr. Collins requested that the district court 
seal his court file, because "public access to Mr. Collins' case has caused him financial 
hardship due to two prospective employers denying him employment because of his 
association with this case," and because "public access to this case might be libelous or 
threaten the safety of Mr. Collins." (R., p.74.) The motion noted that "the charge was 
stigmatizing in nature and the state moved to dismiss just days after Mr. Collins filed his 
Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b)." (R., p.79.) Mr. Collins also stated that he "has 
been denied employment two separate times due to public access to this case on the 
repository." (R., p.79.) Further, Mr. Collins "regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous 
with parolees and probationers who, he fears, could harm him if they were to discover 
he had once been charged with a sex offense." (R., p.79.) Additionally, because "these 
allegations stemmed from Amy Tobiasson, who, on two separate occasions, lied to law 
enforcement, one time alleging she was a victim of rape ... the documents or materials 
in this case could contain libelous statements." (R., p.79.) The motion concluded that 
"[t]he public's 'right to know' is outweighed by the privacy interests of Mr. Collins." 
(R., p.79.) 
At the hearing on the motion to seal his court record, Mr. Collins rested on his 
brief, while the State deferred to the district court. (R., p.i0i.) The district court then 
denied the motion to seal Mr. Collins' court record. (R., p.i01.) The district court 
explained its decision as follows: 
This is, to me, a very, very close call as far as weighing the interest of the 
public to view the record versus Mr. Collins's interest in privacy, and 
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whether this is a libelous statement, whether it's something that balancing 
the economic harm that he can experience as a result of the record being 
open to the public is something that the Court, in its discretion, 
should seal. 
However, having reviewed several times the motion to seal the 
court record, the applicable rules, the case law on point, I do believe that 
the public interest in looking at this court record outweighs Mr. Collins's 
desire and interest, economic interest, to have the court record sealed. 
There's just a very strong expressed preference in the law for 
transparency in government, as reflected by the default, that all records 
should be public. 
(Tr., p.5, Ls.5-23.) 
In its subsequent Order Denying Motion to Seal Court Record, the district court 
stated that it "weighed the public's interest in information and the government's 
obligation for transparency against the Defendant's need and desire to seal his court 
file." (R., pp.107-0B.) While no affidavit had been presented in support of the motion, 
the district court "assumed for the purpose of deciding the motion that [Mr. Collins'] 
claims were true-that [Mr. Collins] was challenged in finding employment and 
stigmatized by the accusation of a sex offense." (R., p.10B n.1.) "After weighing the 
competing interests, the Court denied Defendant's motion to seal the record." 
(R., p.10B.) 
Mr. Collins filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's decision to 
deny the motion to seal his court record. (R., pp.102-05.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Collins' motion to seal his 
court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i)? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Collins' Motion To Seal His 
Court Record Pursuant To I.C.A.R. 32(i} 
Mr. Collins asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to seal his court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i), because it did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards. While the district court recognized that 
this case was a "very, very close call" (Tr., p.5, Ls.5-6), the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards because it did not adequately consider 
Mr. Collins' predominating privacy interests. 
"Decisions of the district court to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule (I.C.A.R.) 32 are reviewed for abuse of discretion." State v. Gurney, 
152 Idaho 502, 503 (2012). An appellate court will affirm the decision of the district 
court if the district court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Governing access to court records, I.C.A.R. 32 acknowledges that "[t]he public 
has a right to examine and copy the judicial department's declarations of law and public 
policy and to examine and copy the records of all proceedings open to the public." 
I.C.A.R. 32(a). However, physical and electronic records "may be disclosed, or 
temporarily or permanently sealed or redacted by order of the court on a case-by-case 
basis." I.C.A.R. 32(i). "Any person or the court on its own motion may move to 
disclose, redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding." 
Id. u[TJhe party moving to seal or redact records bears the burden of proof." Gurney, 
152 Idaho at 504 n.1. 
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"In ruling on whether specific records should be disclosed, redacted or sealed by 
order of the court, the court shall determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the 
interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates." I.C.A.R. 32(i). "If the court 
redacts or seals records to protect predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the 
least restrictive exception from disclosure consistent with privacy interests." Id. 
Before a court may enter an order redacting or sealing records, it must 
also make one or more of the following determinations in writing: 
(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or 
statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a 
reasonable person, or 
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the 
court finds might be libelous, or 
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the 
dissemination or publication of which may compromise the financial 
security of, or could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or 
harm to, a person having an interest in the documents or materials, or 
compromise the security of personnel, records or public property of or 
used by the judicial department, or 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might 
threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or 
materials to preserve the right to a fair trial. 
Id. "In applying these rules, the court is referred to the traditional legal concepts in the 
law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and invasion of proprietary 
business records as well as common sense respect for shielding highly intimate or 
financially sensitive materials about persons." Id. 
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Collins' motion to seal 
his court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i), because it did not act consistently with the 
applicable legal standards. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable 
legal standards because it did not adequately consider Mr. Collins' predominating 
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privacy interests. Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider that the 
documents or materials in Mr. Collins' court records contain facts or statements that 
might be libelous. A district court may seal court records after making a written 
determination that "the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the 
court finds might be libelous." I.C.A.R 32(i)(2). 
As discussed above, I.C.A.R 32(i) states that, "In applying these rules, the court 
is referred to the traditional legal concepts in the law of ... defamation .... " I.C.A.R 
32(i). Mr. Collins submits that a district court may therefore look to Idaho's defamation 
laws when determining whether documents or materials contain facts or statements that 
might be libelous. "Libel" is defined as "a malicious defamation, expressed either by 
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending ... to impeach the honesty, 
integrity, virtue or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is 
alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." I.C. § 18-4801. 
A statement imputing that a person is guilty of a serious crime such as lewd conduct is 
defamatory per se. See Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 570 (1990); Barlow v. 
International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,890 (1974). 
The court records in this case include documents or materials containing facts or 
statements that might be libelous. Specifically, the Complaint and Information contain 
statements that Mr. Collins committed the crime of lewd conduct. Ms. Tobiasson, the 
original source of the allegation against Mr. Collins, had lied to police officers in the 
past. (R, pp.69, 79; see R, pp.91-98.) When viewed alongside the State's request 
that the district court dismiss the charge against Mr. Collins "in the interest of justice," a 
request that closely followed Mr. Collins' giving notice of his intent to present evidence 
on Ms. Tobiasson's past lies (see R., pp.69-72), Ms. Tobiasson's history of lying 
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indicates that she was also lying about Mr. Collins' alleged lewd conduct. Thus, the 
statements that Mr. Collins committed the crime of lewd conduct are defamatory per se. 
Because the documents or materials here contain facts or statements that might be 
libelous, the district court should have sealed Mr. Collins' court records. The district 
court did not adequately consider that the documents or materials in Mr. Collins' court 
records contain facts or statements that might be libelous. 
The district court also did not adequately consider the financial loss Mr. Collins 
has suffered as a result of public access to the court records in this case. A district 
court may seal court records after making a written determination that the documents or 
materials, if disseminated or published, could reasonably result in economic or financial 
loss or harm to a person having an interest in the documents or materials. I.C.A.R 
32(i)(3). The Idaho Court of Appeals recently concluded that "Rule 32(i) gives the court 
discretion to consider the many types of economic or financial loss that may be 
reasonably asserted as a claimed justification for sealing court records, including 
financial harm asserted by those convicted of crimes." Doe v. State, 153 Idaho 685, 
690 (Ct. App. 2012). It follows that a district court would also have jurisdiction to 
consider financial harm asserted by those, such as Mr. Collins, who were merely 
charged with crimes and later had those charges dismissed. See State v. Turpen, 147 
Idaho 869 (2009) (discussing a person's motion to seal his criminal case file on grounds 
of economic harm, where the person had been acquitted of a misdemeanor offense). 
Here, the documents or materials could reasonably result in economic or 
financial loss or harm to Mr. Collins. Indeed, Mr. Collins has already suffered "financial 
hardship due to two prospective employers denying him employment because of his 
association with this case." (R, p.74; see R, p.79.) Thus, the district court should have 
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sealed the court records. The district court did not adequately consider the financial 
loss Mr. Collins has suffered as a result of public access to the court records in 
this case. 
Further, the district court did not adequately consider that public access to the 
court records may threaten Mr. Collins' safety. A district court may seal court records 
after making a written determination that the documents or materials contain facts or 
statements that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals. I.C.A.R. 
32(i)(4). In the motion, Mr. Collins stated that he "regularly attends Alcoholics 
Anonymous with parolees and probationers who, he fears, could harm him if they were 
to discover he had once been charged with a sex offense." (R., p.79.) Because the 
court records contain facts or statements that might threaten the safety of Mr. Collins, 
the district court should have sealed the court records. The district court did not 
adequately consider that public access to the court records may threaten 
Mr. Collins' safety. 
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above predominating 
privacy interests, it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Thus, 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Collins' motion to seal his court 
record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i), because it did not act consistently with the applicable 
legal standards. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Collins respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's order denying his motion to seal his court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 
32(i), and remand the case to the district court with instructions to grant the motion. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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